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Abstract
The dynamic general equilibrium model with hiring costs presented in this paper
delivers involuntary unemployment in the steady state as well as involuntary ﬂuctua-
tions in unemployment. The existence of hiring friction introduces externalities that,
in turn, entail the breakdown of the “divine coincidence” without assuming real wage
rigidity. Our model with labour market imperfections outperforms the standard NK
model as for the persistence of responses to monetary shocks. The model also allows
for an analysis of the volatility of economies, diﬀering in their “degrees of labour mar-
ket rigidity”. It turns out that “rigid” economies exhibit less unemployment volatility
and more inﬂation volatility than “ﬂexible” economies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E24, E31, E32, E52; J64
Keywords: Hiring Costs, Wage Bargaining, Output Gap, New Keynesian Phillips
Curve
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11 Introduction and motivation
1.1 The shortcomings of the NK model
Since the late Nineties a standard New Keynesian (NK) dynamic general equilibrium model
h a se m e r g e dw h i c hi sw i d e l yu s e da saw o r k - h o r s ef o rm o n e t a r yp o l i c y .S u c ham o d e li s
built on microfoundations coming from the Real Business Cycle (RBC) i.e. intertemporal
optimisation of inﬁnitely lived, fully rational, consumers and ﬁrms. The NK model departs
from the RBC in assuming imperfect competition in the products market and staggered
prices àl áCalvo (1983). As a result of this blend of RBC and Keynesian ingredients a
NK Phillips curve is derived which implies that monetary policy can have relevant eﬀects
on real output, something the RBC model alone cannot deliver1.
However, it is now commonly aknowledged that the standard NK model has three main
shortcomings: 1) there is no involuntary unemployment, because of the hypothesis of a
Walrasian labour market; 2) there is no trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output gap stabil-
isation; 3) contrary to empirical evidence, in the model the inﬂation response to shocks
is greater than the output response, whilst output ﬂuctuations cannot be as persistent as
they appear to be in the real world.
The absence of involuntary unemployment is a serious shortcoming for a model la-
belled as “Keynesian”, however abridged or reformed. In the standard NK model output
ﬂuctuations imply that people vary the hourst h e yw o r k( v a r i a t i o no ft h ei n t e n s i v em a r -
gin) but the number of people employed never changes (that is, there is no variation of
the extensive margin). Such an un-Keynesian feature of the NK model is at odds with
empirical evidence, which does show changes in the number of people working whilst does
not show a labour supply as wage elastic as needed for the adjustment to take place along
the intensive margin alone (Trigari, 2005; Faia, 2007; Ravenna, Walsh, 2007).
The absence of a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output stabilisation in the standard
NK model has been christened “divine coincidence” (Blanchard, Galí, 2007). The divine
coincidence “is tightly linked to a speciﬁc property of the standard NK model, namely the
fact that the gap between the natural level of output and the eﬃcient (ﬁrst best) level
of output is constant and invariant to shocks” (Blanchard, Galí, 2007, p. 36). Such a
feature of the standard NK model entails that stabilising the actual output gap (i.e. the
diﬀerence between actual and “natural” output) is equivalent to stabilising the welfare
1This earlier literature, described by Goodfriend and King (1997), has often been labelled as “New
Neoclassical Synthesis”.
2relevant output gap (i.e. the diﬀerence between actual output and ﬁrst best output). As
stabilising inﬂation also stabilises the actual output gap, the standard NK model implies
that stabilising inﬂation brings about stabilisation of the welfare relevant output gap: a
divine coincidence indeed. A divine coincidence that makes inﬂation targeting sorrounded
b yah a l oo fo p t i m a l i t y 2.
As for the inability at delivering enough persistence of output ﬂuctuations after a
nominal shock, it may be argued that the presence of nominal rigidities is not able to
overcome the RBC feature of the model, in which forward looking workers and ﬁrms are
able to rapidly adjust their hiring and working decisions in a perfectly competitive labour
market. In a Walrasian labour market, ﬂuctuations in employment levels are interpreted
as the outcome of voluntary choices and must be accompanied by real wage changes: a
temporary increase in the current wage leads workers to oﬀer more labour services in the
current period, in exchange for more leisure in the future. However, a smoother correlation
between wages and employment is frequently observed, and this evidence is at variance
with the theoretical RBC predictions, unless the (real) wage elasticity of labour supply is
implausibly high3.
With a Walrasian labour market, it is diﬃcult to oﬀer some plausible rationales for
the insensitive reaction of marginal costs to demand shocks. The missing explanation for
acyclical real wage patterns is at the root of an intrinsic inability of the standard NK
model to reproduce the low sensitivity of real marginal costs to output changes and to
replicate the sluggishness in price setting behavior. Only by assuming a high degree of
nominal inertia - which prevents ﬁrms from full price adjustments - one may preserve the
hypothesis of a sensitive marginal cost and still obtain the stickiness in price behaviour
observed in reality. However, microeconomic data on price setting show that the majority
of ﬁrms resets their prices more frequently than once a year (see for instance Blinder et al.,
1998, and Carlton, 1986). The eﬀective role of nominal frictions has been raised by Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), by showing that, for a wide range of parameter values of a
speciﬁed model with a non-competitive product market, the hypothesis of staggering alone
2“The present theory implies not only that price stability should matter in addition to stability of the
output gap, but also that, at least under certain circumstances, inﬂation stabilization eliminates any need
for furthur concerner with the level of real activity. This is because [...] the time-varying eﬃcient level of
output is the same (up to a constant, which does not aﬀect the basic point) as the level of output that
eliminates any incentive for ﬁrms on average to either raise or lower their prices”. (Woodford, 2003, p. 13)
3The empirical evidence reveals a low elasticity of employment to the real wage. See, for instance,
Pencavel (1986).
3does not succeed in explaining the size and persistence of observed cyclical ﬂuctuations.
1.2 Labour market imperfections and real wage rigidities
Many attempts have recently been made at overcoming the above mentioned shortcomings
of the standard NK model. In a few recent papers (e.g. Christoﬀel Linzert, 2005, Trigari,
2005 and Walsh, 2005), search frictions are introduced alongside a Mortensen, Pissarides
(1994, 1999) matching function4. In this framework workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages
and share the positive rents arising from a successul match. However, this rule makes
the wage proportional to productivity changes or to changes in labour market tightness,
which means that labour compensations absorb and ﬁlter exogenous shocks. Thus, in case
of a positive shock, little space is left for the opening of new vacancies, while in case of
an adverse shock, the low recruiting eﬀort of employees is still unexplained. This means
that the matching model does not account for the variability of vacancies and does not
reproduce the employment ﬂuctuations observed in reality5.
It is only under some stickiness in the real wage, as that obtained by Hall (2005) with
the assumption of a wage norm, that the Mortensen and Pissarides approach gains more
empirical relevance. However, Hall explicitly admits that he does not “venture into the
territory of explaining why the economy appears to choose sticky wages from the wide
variety of alternative equilibrium wage patterns” (Hall, 2005, 51). In fact the studies
mentioned above combine searching frictions and real wage rigidity in order to obtain a
model economy where plausible output and inﬂation dynamics are obtained.
Blanchard, Galí (2007) bypass the labour market imperfection issue by assuming real
wage stickiness straight away. They show that when real wage stickiness alone is introduced
in an otherwise standard NK model the divine coincidence disappears: stabilising inﬂation
4Alongside these attempts another strand of research grew aimed at introducing additional rationales
for nominal rigidities: from the sticky information approach, developed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), to the
staggered nominal wage contracts approach, proposed by Christiano, Eichnbaum and Evans (2005), from the
rule of thumb behavior in price or wage setting, advanced by Galì and Gertler (1999) and Rabanal (2001),
to the lagged indexation assumption advanced by Smet and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichnbaum
and Evans (2005). Furthermore, attempts at introducing eﬃciency wages in a dynamic general equilibrium
model have been made by Felices (2002), Alexopoulos (2004), Danthine and Kurmann (2004).
5For instance, in the U.S., as argued in Shimer (2005), the standard deviation of the vacancy-
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t i oi sa l m o s t2 0t i m e sa sl a r g ea st h es t andard deviation of productivity, while the search
model predicts the same volatility. Analogous evidence is observed by Hall (2005) in case of demand
shocks, thus proving that “recessions are times when the labor markets of all industries slacken - not times
when workers moves from industry with slack markets to other with tight markets”(Hall, 2005, p. 52).
4is no longer equivalent to stabilising the welfare relevant output gap and inﬂation targeting
is no longer optimal6.
1.3 The present paper
In the present paper we prove that with no need for (exogenous) real wage rigidity but
by introducing in a New Keynesian model a more realistic labour market structure, it is
possible to have, at once, involuntary unemployment, persistent output ﬂuctuations, and
the end of the divine coincidence.
The key to our results is the interplay of two crucial changes that we introduce in an
otherwise fairly standard New Keynesian DSGE model. First, we replace the assumption
that labour adjustments take place along the intensive margin with the (more realistic)
adjustment along the extensive margin. Second, we introduce hiring costs due to post
advertising, screening and training àl aH o w i t t(1988). It is apparent that the role of
hiring costs is magniﬁed when labour adjustment along the intensive margin are ruled
out, as increases or reductions of labour hours require hiring (and ﬁring). On the other
hand the presence of hiring costs generates rents for the existent employment relation.
Such rents have to be shared between ﬁrms and employees according to their respective
bargaining power. Moreover, hiring costs generate a dynamic externality, as past hiring
decisions aﬀect present and future (expected) hiring costs. As a consequence, the dynamic
behaviour of a decentralised economy with hiring costs is markedly diﬀerent from that of
the constrained eﬃcient economy. The divine coincidence vanishes whenever the elasticity
of hiring costs to labour market tightness is diﬀerent from the index of workers’ relative
bargaining power. Contrary to other models in the literature, in our model economy, the
countercyclical mark up is generated by the marginal component of hiring costs and by the
related bargaining process and it can be obtained for a full range of production functions,
i.e. even without assuming diminishing returns to labour7.
6In an unpublished paper, Blanchard, Galí (2006) introduced labour market frictions alongside real
wage stickiness, obtaining basically the same results as in their 2007 article.
7In the standard NK model, price rigidities are associated with countercyclical mark-up and procyclical
wage responses only when marginal returns to labour are decreasing. Indeed, in that framework, under
positive nominal shocks price rigidities cause output ﬂuctuations and increases of marginal costs; hence,
one gets a reduction of the price-cost margin that causes an outward shift of the demand curve (due to
the lower mark -up) and a movement along the labour supply curve, with a positive impact on real wages.
Notice also that in our model economy the procyclical wage response tends to be milder since the wage
curve is ﬂatter, and it is no surprising that for reasonable parameters values it is likely to obtain the
5In this context, workers payments do not fully compensate changes in labour market
tightness and an endogenous real wage rigidity comes to the forefront. It turns out to be
decisive when a nominal shock hits the economy. After allowing for staggered pricing àl a
Calvo, we show that - due to the absence of divine coincidence - neither is pure inﬂation
targeting able to stabilise employment ﬂuctuations nor is pure employment targeting able
to stabilise inﬂation, as it would be the case in a standard NK model. Furthermore, the New
Keynesian Phillips curve we derive permits to show that all the labour market institutions
that enhance real wage rigidities reduce the individual incentive to price adjustments, and
these inertial behaviour are magniﬁed under price complementarities.
The present paper is a reﬁnement and an extension of a previous one (Abbritti, Boi-
tani, Damiani, 2006). The reﬁnement consists in (a) the adoption of a more standard
households’ utility function; (b) the adoption of Blanchard Galí (2006) speciﬁcation of
the hiring cost function; and (3) the use of a constrained eﬃcient equilibrium as a steady
state target that the benevolent social planner is able to reach by means of lump-sum
subsidies to unemployed workers. By so doing we make it easier to compare our results
with those obtained in the recent literature. At the same time we preserve the tractability
of the model, which we regard as an important “plus”. This is achieved by not going all
the way down to allow both intensive and extensive margin adjustments or to introduce
af u l l - ﬂedged search and matching model of the labour market. Instead, we ﬁnd a simple
way for tracing a plausible relationship among parameteres representing diﬀerent labour
market “institutions”. For instance, a lower separation rate, and therefore a higher labour
protection, is usually associated to higher values of all the other factors that cause higher
unemployment rates and lower job ﬁnding rates.
Our model, as many other models with labour market imperfections, outperforms the
standard NK model as for the persistence of responses to monetary shocks. In order to
test the ability of our model to ﬁt some real-world feature of economic dynamics, we
identify a measure of economy-wide labour market rigidity, based on the unemployment
r a t ea n do nt h ej o bﬁnding rate (but not on real wage stickiness). This allows us to
simulate the inﬂation and output volatility of two economies diﬀering in their degree of
labour market rigidity. We ﬁnd that a “rigid” economy (according to our measure) displays
higher unemployment volatility and lower inﬂation volatility than a “ﬂexible” economy.
A result that is broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of Giannone, Reichlin (2006) referred
to the ﬂe x i b l eU Sa n dt h er i g i dE u r oa r e a .
acyclicalities in real wage patterns observed in many countries.
6The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the most controversial aspects
of the standard NK model are sketched out for future reference. Section 3 is devoted to
the building blocks of the model with hiring costs, i.e. the (by now standard) derivation
of a new IS curve from utility maximisation and that of hiring, pricing and employment
decisions. In section 4 the decentralised and the constrained eﬃcient equilibria of this
economy are derived and compared, stressing the role played by labour market external-
ities in the dynamics of a decentralised economy. Section 5 deals with staggered prices
and shows the breakdown of the divine coincidence. After presenting the reduced model
in section 6, and discussing the parameters used to calibrate the model (section 7), we
compare the dynamics of our model with hiring frictions and that of a standard NK model
in section 8. Section 9 presents our analysis of the relationship between labour market
rigidity and the volatility of unemployment and inﬂation. Section 10 brieﬂy concludes.
2 At the heart of divine coincidence
The standard NK models integrate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities into a
dynamic general equilibrium framework largely associated with the RBC paradigm (Galí
2002). In particular, the NK model inherits from the RBC literature a neoclassical labour
market. This fact leads, in our view, to some of the weaknesses of this model.
In a standard NK model, the period utility function depends on consumption Ct and










Utility maximization leads to a standard labour supply equation where the real wage equals






. On the supply side, ﬁrms choose prices
taking into consideration the marginal cost’s dynamics, which simply reﬂects movements










This speciﬁcation of the labour market is at the heart of some of the criticism around
the NK model. As the labour supply turns out to be binding in equilibrium, the model is
unable to explain involuntary unemployment.
Moreover, in the standard NK model a meaningful policy trade-oﬀ between output and
inﬂation stabilisation is absent. To see this, consider the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
πt = βEtπt+1 + λzt (3)
7where πt is inﬂation and zt is the output gap. Iterating forward, one can express the





Using (3), it is easy to show that a pure inﬂation targeting strategy, i.e. a strategy
where πt =0at all t, completely stabilises the output gap, i.e. zt =0at all t. Viceversa,
a strategy that stabilises the output gap in each period, setting zt =0at all t,c o m -
pletely stabilises inﬂation (πt =0at all t). Hence the monetary authority does not face
ap o l i c yt r a d e - o ﬀ between output and inﬂation stabilisation: this is the essence of “divine
coincidence” (Blanchard Galí, 2007). Such a divine coincidence is seen as unsatisfactory
by many researcher and central bankers. In the following sections we shall argue that,
even without imposing explicitly some form of real wage rigidity, the divine coincidence
disappears as soon as a more realistic structure for the labour market is introduced.
3 Flexible price equilibrium
This section presents a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with labour
and product market imperfections. There are three groups of agents: households, ﬁrms
and a monetary authority. Households maximise lifetime utility derived from consumption
of a composite good and from leisure. Monopolistically competitive ﬁrms maximise proﬁts
by choosing prices and employment levels, under the constraint of hiring costs and facing
an exogenous separation rate. Workers and employers bargain over wages: the two parties
share the positive surplus arising from a successful hiring. Under fully ﬂexible prices and
wages the central bank’s only role is ﬁxing the inﬂation rate.
3.1 Households
The representative household is thought of as a continuum of members with names on the
unit interval. In equilibrium, some individuals will be employed and others will not be; to
avoid distributional issues, we follow most of the literature in assuming that households
perfectly insure each other against ﬂuctuations in consumption.

























where β is the subjective discount factor and σ i st h ec o n s t a n td e g r e eo fr e l a t i v er i s k






Notice that the disutility of labour for the household is the aggregate of the individuals’
disutility of labour. Empirical evidence suggests that most of the labour adjustment takes
place along the extensive margin. Accordingly and for simplicity, we assume that each
individual works a ﬁxed number of hours ht = ¯ h. Hence we rule out by assumption
all adjustments along the intensive margin. This assumption helps in magnifying the
dynamic eﬀects of hiring costs. Such eﬀects, however, would not disappear had the model
encompassed variations along the intensive margin. Thank to our assumption, the utility
function is linear in the number of the employed people.








where Ct is a standard Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundle with elasticity of substitution
 , Pt is the aggregate price level, (1 + it) is the gross nominal interest rate of one-period
bond and Dt is the per capita family income in period t, which is the sum of the wage
income earned by employed family members and the family share of aggregate proﬁts from
ﬁrms, net of government lump-sum taxes.
Solving the intertemporal optimisation problem one gets the following ﬁrst order con-
dition:
C−σ








Log-linearising equation (6) around the steady state, one gets the new IS curve (McCallum
and Nelson, 1999):
ˆ ct = Etˆ ct+1 −
1
σ
(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1) (7)
where variables with a hat denote log-deviations from steady state and πt =l o g Pt
Pt−1 is
the inﬂation rate at time t.
93.2 Firms and the labour market
3.2.1 Hiring decisions





where productivity At follows an AR(1)process.
In such a model, employment dynamics can be deﬁned by assuming an average sepa-
ration rate equal to δ,w h e r eδ ∈ (0,1), and on the basis of an optimum hiring rate equal
to Ht, endogenously determined as the outcome of optimal choices by individual ﬁrms.
The separation rate δ, which is a measure of the probability of job termination, is simply
considered as an exogenous parameter in some of the literature, even if some other studies
have tried to provide an endogenous determination (see, e.g. Trigari, 2005; Walsh, 2005).
The parameter δ can be interpreted as the inverse of the degree of labour protection.
The evolution of employment at ﬁrm i is determined by the following:
Ni
t =( 1− δ)Ni
t−1 + Hi
t (9)
At the aggregate level, employment Nt ≡
R 1
0 Ni
tdi evolves according to the following:




tdi denotes the aggregate hiring level.
We denote by Ut the pool of jobless individuals who are available for new jobs. Since we
assume full participation and the labour force is normalised to 1, Ut is deﬁned as follows:
Ut =1− (1 − δ)Nt−1
After hiring decisions are undertaken, unemployment is deﬁned as ut =1− Nt.
The optimal hiring decisions are made under the hypothesis, suggested in Howitt
(1988), that ﬁrms face a cost of searching and recruiting new workers. Speciﬁcally, we
assume, as in Blanchard, Galí (2006), that hiring costs for ﬁrm i are given as follows:
GtHi
t (11)
where unit hiring costs are an increasing function of the labour market tightness index
xt = Ht
Ut :







10where the elasticity of the hiring cost function α>0 and B is a scaling parameter that
may be inﬂuenced by the policy maker.
The relevance of Gt in our model economy is strictly related to the extensive margin
hypothesis: each ﬁrm may adjust its optimal amount of labour by recruiting additional
workers and thus paying the hiring cost8. Furthermore, the marginal cost of hiring is
increasing in the aggregate level of hiring Ht; this captures the idea that a high rate of
hiring may force ﬁrms to increase their search intensity. That means that with an increase
in employment due to hiring (Ht) a “congestion” eﬀect occurs: the recruitment process
becomes more diﬃcult and the matching less favourable. Viceversa, with an increase in
Ut, it is easier for the ﬁrm to recruit workers, and the matching between the skills required
by the ﬁrm and those oﬀered by the available work-force improves.
3.2.2 Price and wage determination





where the term μ =  
 −1 is the mark up.
With ﬂexible prices, in a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms will charge the same price
(pi
t = Pt). This implies that the real marginal cost will be constant and equal to the





The current expected value of the marginal cost MCt is aﬀected by the presence of hiring
8The relevance of hiring costs emerges even in more general models, where extensive margin adjustments
are accompanied by intensive margin adjustments, provided the ﬁr s tk i n do fa d j u s t m e n td o e sn o tp l a ya
trivial role.






































relevant stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs.




















By inspection of (15) one can see that hiring new workers at time t has two eﬀects: i)
it increases the recruitment costs at time t -a ne ﬀect represented by the term Bxα
t ; ii) it
reduces the costs of hiring new workers in period t +1 , since higher levels of recruiting
eﬀorts undertaken in the ﬁrst period decrease the needs for ﬁrms to hire in the following
period. The second eﬀect is captured by the last term in (15). In this model the presence
of hiring costs creates a wedge between the real wage and the marginal cost relevant for
the ﬁrm, which turns out to be crucial in the explanation of inﬂation dynamics. Such
a wedge leads the cyclical behaviour of marginal costs in a model with labour market
imperfections to substantially deviate from that of real wages (compare 15 with 2). As
Krause and Lubik (2005, p. 11) notice, “hiring frictions generate a surplus for existing
matches which give rise to long-term employment relationships. These, in turn, reduce
the allocative role of current real wages. As a consequence, the eﬀective real marginal cost
can change even if the wage does not change”.
The presence of search frictions creates a positive rent for existing employment rela-
tionships. Following much of the literature, we assume wages are bargained to split this
rent between the ﬁrm and the employee, according to their respective bargaining power
(Nash bargaining).
Let η denote the relative weight of workers in the Nash bargaining10.I tc a nb es h o w n



























Intuitively, the Nash wage depends on the reservation wage (here given by the marginal rate




) plus a volatile “wage premium”,
which depends on the size of the rents for existing employment relationships (the term in
curled brackets) and on the workers’ relative share of the surplus, η.T h el o w e ri sη the
less inﬂuenced is the Nash wage by the possibly volatile components in (16). The size of
the rents is determined by the hiring cost component of the marginal costs in (15), and by
taking into account that the probability not to ﬁnd a work in the next period (1 − xt+1)
exerts a disciplinary inﬂuence on current bargaining because it reduces the future workers’
10If we denote by ψ the relative bargaining power of workers, it is easy to show that η =
ψ
1−ψ
12share of the matching surplus and thus exerts a disciplinary inﬂuence on today’s current
bargaining. By inspection of (15) and (16) one can thus easiliy verify that hiring frictions
cause a double dynamic eﬀect: the next period tighteness of the labour market causes a
larger saving in hirings costs today (the direct eﬀect) and, additionally, it inﬂuences the
wage setting (the indirect eﬀect).
4 The natural and constrained eﬃcient equilibria
Substituting the wage schedule (16) in the expression for the marginal costs, we get the
















t+1 [1 + η(1 − xt+1)]
)
The left hand side represents the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labour; the right hand side the corresponding marginal private rate of transformation
(both normalised by productivity). In an equilibrium with ﬂexible prices and Nash bar-
gained wages, employment is invariant to productivity only if the utility function is log
in consumption, i.e. σ =1 .
It is also possible to solve the problem of a benevolent social planner that maximises the
welfare of the representative household in an economy with the technological constraints
and labour market frictions described so far. Notice that the social planner internalises the
eﬀects of variations in employment on hiring costs. Hence the equilibrium one ﬁnds is a



















which must hold with strict equality if Nt < 1. This condition (together with the resource
constraints) determine the optimal employment level in equilibrium. The main diﬀerence
between (18) and (17) is that in the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labour is equal to the marginal social rate of
transformation, as the social planner successfully internalises all labour market externali-
ties.
Comparing the constrained eﬃcient and the decentralised equilibrium with ﬂexible
prices, i.e. eq. (18) and eq. (17) respectively, we can see that - as in Blanchard, Galí
(2006) - the two equilibria are identical when two conditions are fulﬁlled:
1. The mark-up μ =1 .
2. The workers’ relative share of the surplus in the Nash bargaining, η,c o i n c i d e sw i t h
the elasticity of the hiring cost function, α (Hosios condition).
To better clarify the meaning of the second condition, notice that in decentralised
economies each ﬁrm sets its optimal amount of hirings, whithout internalising the eﬀects
on other ﬁrms with the result that the sum of all individual decisions is conducive to an
aggregate suboptimal outcome. Indeed, when the workers’ share of the matching surplus
η is small in comparison with the hiring costs elasticity α, recruiting additional workers
will be highly proﬁtable and employment will set at a higher level; the opposite must
be true in case of an excessive workers’ bargaining power ((α − η) < 0) that reduces the














Ct = AtNt − GtHt = At (Nt − Bx
α
t Ht)
0 ≤ Nt ≤ 1
Notice that we use the fact that, given simmetry in preferences and technology, the social planner chooses
an equilibrium in which Ct(i)=Ct. Moreover, since participation in the labour market, by lowering hiring
costs, has no individual costs but some social beneﬁts, the social planner will choose an allocation with
full participation. See also Blanchard-Galì (2006).
14incentive to hiring. It is only under the strict equality η = a (as well as μ =1 )t h a ta
decentralised equilibrium ends up to be coincident with the optimal social choice.
In the following, to avoid complications arising from the fact that the steady state
unemployment diﬀers in the two cases, we assume that employment is subsidised at a
constant subsidy V.M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h es u b s i d yV is such that the steady
state employment level under the decentralised equilibrium corresponds to the steady state
employment under the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium12. Notice that, even if the steady
state levels correspond, in the short run the dynamics in the two allocations can (and will)
diﬀer.
It must be emphasised that in our model economy - where variations of intensive mar-
gin are replaced by variations of extensive margin - exogenous shocks cause changes in the
number of hirings and in recruitment costs. Additionally, the successful matching and the
related surpluses oﬀer more opportunities for wage premia and cause a departure of wage
rates from competitive values. Indeed, in all the cases where α 6= η one obtains, as seen
before, a deviation of the natural equilibrium from the eﬃcient allocation. Furthermore,
the bargaining process, for low values of η, introduces a substantial degree of wage rigidity
(as already mentioned); this eﬀect is not counterbalanced by the reservation wage compo-
nent, that under the extensive margin hypothesis, exhibits, as we will see better below, a
lower elasticity to changes in real activities.
4.1 About output gaps
Blanchard, Galí (2007) argue that the divine coincidence is due to the fact that the gap
between the eﬃcient level of output and the natural level of output (i.e. the one that would
prevail if prices were ﬂexible) is constant. They also argue that the divine coincidence
breaks down in the presence of real wage rigidities.
In this section we show how in our model, even in the absence of real wage rigidities,t h e
gap between the eﬃcient and the natural level of employment (or output) is not constant.
12It can be shown that the costant subsidy V is:
V = μ{1 − g(α − η)(1− β(1 − δ)(1 − x)}
where g = Bx

























15The divine coincidence does not hold. The reason is very simple: as the presence of hiring
frictions introduces externalities (both ﬁrms and workers do not realise the eﬀects that
their decisions have on the labour market tightness indicator and thus on aggregate hiring
costs) the decentralised equilibrium will not move eﬃciently. As we shall see in section
5.1 this is the premise for the breakdown of the divine coincidence.
Let variables with bars and the subscript 1 denote log deviations from the steady
state of the endogenous variables under the eﬃcient outcome while ˆ at is an exogenous
productivity shocks. Log-linearizing equation (18), we get the evolution of the constrained




C−σ (σ − 1)ˆ at − (1 + α)αg [¯ x1t − β(1 − x)Et¯ x1t+1] (19)
where g = Bxα and the variables without time subscripts denote steady state values. It can
be shown that the constrained eﬃcient employment level will be invariant to productivity
s h o c k si fa n do n l yi fσ =1 . Intuitively, when σ =1the ﬁrst term on the right hand side
of (19) vanishes and the productivity shock has no eﬀect on the labour market tightness
and hence both ¯ x1t and Et¯ x1t+1 are equal to zero13.
Similarly, it is possible to ﬁnd the evolution of natural employment level (the subscript




C−σ (σ − 1)ˆ at − (1 + η)αg¯ x2t + βg[α + αη (1 − x) − ηx]Et¯ x2t+1 (20)
13To derive this solution, we use the fact that the loglinear approximations for the labor market tightness
xt =
Ht
Ut and for consumption are given by:
δ¯ x1t =¯ n1t − (1 − δ)(1 − x)¯ n1t−1










Following Blanchard-Galì (2006), we introduce two approximations that considerably simplify the char-
acterization of the equilibrium:
1. Hiring costs are small relative to output, so that we can approximate ¯ c1t with ¯ c1t =ˆ at +¯ n1t.M o r e
precisely, we assume that δ and g are of the same order of magnitude of ¯ n1t, implying that terms involving
g¯ n1t or δ¯ n1tare of second order. We assume the same to be true for ˆ at (i.e. ˆ at and ¯ n1t are of the same
order).
2. Fluctuations in ¯ x1t are large relative to those in ¯ n1t, an approximation that follows from the log-
linearization of the labor tightness index and the assumption of a low separation rate. This implies that
terms involving g¯ x1t or δ¯ x1t cannot be ignored.
Similar approximations are used in the derivation of the ﬂexible prices and sticky prices cases.
16Expression (20) is very similar to (19). Again, in (20) if σ =1employment will be
invariant to productivity shocks. The reason, in both cases, is that the income eﬀect and
the substitution eﬀect on labour supply oﬀset one another. But there is one key diﬀerence
between the two solutions: while in the constrained eﬃcient solution the social planner
correctly internalises the eﬀects of additional hirings on hiring costs - and the elasticity
of (shadow) wages to labour market tightness changes is α - in the decentralised solution
workers and ﬁrms do not internalise this eﬀect and the elasticity of wages to labour market
tightness changes is given by the workers’ relative share of the employment rent, η.
We can also express the evolution of natural employment as deviations from the eﬃcient
level. Deﬁne the employment gap as ˜ nt =¯ n2t−¯ n1t. After some algebra we get the evolution
of the gap between ﬁrst and second best employment:
˜ nt = −(1 + η)αg ˜ xt + βg [α + αη(1 − x) − ηx]Et˜ xt+1 +( α − η)
g
δ
 ˆ Tt (21)
where   = C−σ
σχ , ˆ Tt = ko¯ n1t − k1Et¯ n1t+1 − k2¯ n1t−1 varies with exogenous shocks and the
parameters k0,k 1,k 2 depend on structural parameters. Interestingly, as long as α 6= η,t h e
gap between the constrained eﬃcient and the natural employment levels is not constant
but varies with shocks (through variations in ˆ Tt). That means that even in absence of real
wage rigidities, the conditions under which the divine coincidence holds are not met.A s
already stressed, the reason for this is the presence of a labour market externality: in the
decentralised economy ﬁrms do not internalise the eﬀects that their hiring decisions have
on the aggregate hiring costs. The presence of this dynamic externality means that - even
if the steady state of the constrained eﬃcient economy and the decentralised one are the
same - the dynamics of the two economies are diﬀerent. The presence of an externality
- even a dynamic one - implies a market failure and is a prima facie reason for policy
intervention. As we shall see in the following sections this has profound implications for
the trade oﬀs the Central Bank has to face when designing its monetary policy.
5 Introducing Sticky Prices
We now introduce nominal rigidities using the formalism àl aCalvo (1983). In each period,
ﬁrms may reset their prices with a probability (1 − ζ) - independent of the time elapsed
since the last revision of prices. The expected time over which the price is ﬁxed is therefore
1
1−ζ. The remaining fraction ζ of ﬁrms are not allowed to adjust prices.
17Log-linearizing around a zero inﬂation steady state the optimal price setting rule14 and
the price index equation Pt =
£
(1 − ζ)(P∗
t )1−  + ζ(Pt−1)1− ¤ 1
1− ,w eg e tt h eN e wK e y n e s i a n
Phillips curve:
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + λc mct (22)
where ˆ πt denotes consumer prices’ inﬂation, λ =( 1− βζ)(1 − ζ)/ζ and c mct represent the
log deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value. Note that, while (22) looks
like a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, the dynamics of the real marginal costs
are now substantially diﬀerent from the ones of a standard NK model, as they are deeply
aﬀected by the labour market institutions. In fact, it is possible to show that the dynamics










where variables with tilda are deviations of the sticky price outcome from the constrained
eﬃcient allocation.
Equation (23) highlights the determinants of marginal costs. Marginal costs increase
with the number of the employed (˜ nt)a st h eﬁrm has to pay higher wages to persuade
households to provide more labour. This is the only channel at work in the standard
NK model. In the hiring cost model, the changing of labour market conditions at time
t (i.e. an increase of ˜ xt) increases marginal costs through two channels. A more tight
labour market, in fact, increases both hiring costs and the bargained wage, as the rents
associated to an existing employment relationship are higher. An expected increase of
Et˜ xt+1, instead, has the opposite eﬀect, as it becomes convenient for the ﬁrm to hire at
time t in order to be ready for a more diﬃcult labour market in time t+1. Finally, in the
presence of the labour market externality (i.e. when α 6= η), productivity shocks have an
indipendent eﬀect on marginal costs: the divine coincidence does not hold.


















t denotes the price newly set at time t, Yt+s/t is the level of output in period t+s for a ﬁrm
resetting its price in period t and
 




Pt+s is the stochastic
discount factor for nominal payoﬀs.
185.1 The Divine Coincidence breaks down
In this model, the presence of labour market frictions introduces a non-trivial trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and output gap stabilization: the divine coincidence does not hold.
To see this more clearly, consider at ﬁrst a central bank that adopts a “pure inﬂation
targeting” strategy, i.e. a strategy aimed at stabilising inﬂation at all horizons (ˆ πt =0
for all t). From (22) and (23) it follows that the employment gap evolves according to the
following:
˜ nt = −(1 + η)αg ˜ xt + βg [α + αη(1 − x) − ηx]Et˜ xt+1 +( α − η)
g
δ
 ˆ Tt (24)
where ˆ Tt (as long as σ 6=1 ) is positively related to productivity shocks.
T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n tt on o t ei st h a th e r e-i nc o n t r a s tt ot h es t a n d a r dN Km o d e l
- a pure inﬂation targeting strategy is unable to stabilise the employment gap in the
face of productivity shocks: employment deviations from the benchmark will be sizeable
and display a high degree of inertia. Notice also that under the pure inﬂation targeting
strategy, ﬁrms have no incentive to change their prices15; accordingly, the dynamics of the
employment gap replicate exactly the dynamics under ﬂexible prices, as can be easily seen
by comparing (24) with (21).
Secondly, consider a “pure employment targeting” policy, a strategy aimed at stabil-
ising the (un)employment gap in each period, i.e. ˜ nt =0for all t, which implies that also
the labour market tightness is constant (˜ xt) for all t. Iterating forward the Phillips Curve
(22), one gets:









A “pure employment targeting” strategy is thus unable to stabilise inﬂation. The presence
of hiring costs, by aﬀecting the distance between the constrained eﬃcient and the natural
level of output, creates a non trivial trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation stabilisation.
This calls into question the role of the monetary authority.
We remark that either one or the other of the following conditions must be satisﬁed
for the divine coincidence to hold:
1. The intertemporal substitution parameter, 1
σ,m u s tb ee q u a lt o1,i . e . σ =1 .I f
σ =1 , in fact, the income and substitution eﬀects on labour supply oﬀset each other
and employment is invariant to productivity shocks. Hence, as the dynamics are closed,
15See e.g. Galí (2002) for a discussion of this point.
19the dynamic externality cannot have any impact. Mathematically, since ¯ n1t =¯ n1t+1 =
¯ n1t−1 =0 , ˆ Tt =0 .
2. The elasticity of hiring costs to labour market tightness, α, is equal to the rela-
tive bargaining power of workers, η (Hosios condition). When α = η the labour market
externality and consequently the dynamic trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment
stabilization disappear.
For the divine coincidence not to hold σ 6=1and α 6= η must simultaneously apply.
Interestingly, the direction of the trade-oﬀ is not uncontroversial, since it depends on the
hiring costs frictions and on the workers’ bargaining power.
Consider for instance equation (24). Three cases can be considered. When α>η ,a
positive productivity shock generates a positive employment gap, i.e. employment under
the decentralised solution reacts more than under the eﬃcient solution. Intuitively, the
hiring cost elasticity α determines the eﬃcient response of wages to hiring costs, while the
workers’ share in the Nash bargaining, η, determines how wages evolve in the decentralised
equilibrium. When α>η , the response of wages to shocks in the decentralised equilib-
rium is ineﬃciently low, and employment reactions is too strong, giving rise to a positive
employment gap. When α<ηthe opposite is true and a productivity shock creates a
negative employment gap. In the limiting case α = η, real wages react exactly as they
would in the constrained eﬃcient solution, the labour market externality disappears and
the divine coincidence holds again16.
The presence of the labour market externality is thus likely to have interesting policy
implications. To the extent that the central bank values both inﬂation and unemployment
stabilization, a pure inﬂation targeting strategy is not optimal anymore. The direction of
the interest rate response, however, depends crucially on the labour market characteristics.
Consider again a positive productivity shock. When α>η , real wages do not react
enough to productivity shocks and the central bank can artiﬁcially increase wage reaction
by creating negative inﬂation, thus reducing the employment gap. Similarly, when α<η
the employment gap can be reduced by allowing positive inﬂation, which tends to stabilise
16To get additional intuition about the results, a simple mapping between this model and the standard
labour market search model can also be used. It is easy to show that the hiring cost elasticity α corresponds
to
ξ
1−ξ in the standard search model, where ξ is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
unemployment. As we mentioned before, the workers’ share in the Nash bargaining can be written as
η =
ψ
1−ψ,w h e r eψ is the workers’ relative bargaining power. Since empirical estimates of ξ are close to
0.5, we can consider α to be around 1.I tf o l l o w st h a tη>αif workers’ bargaining power is higher than
ﬁrms’ bargaining power (i.e. ψ>0.5) and viceversa.
20real wages. Optimal monetary policy is thus likely to be pro-cyclical when the workers’
bargaining power is low and counter-cyclical when it is high17.
6 The Monetary Authority and the reduced model
In order to close the model, we need ﬁrst to introduce a suitable characterisation of
monetary policy. As in the present paper we are not interested in pursuing an analysis
of optimal monetary policy, we shall simply assume the Central Bank sets the short term
nominal interest rate by reacting to the average inﬂation and employment gap levels in
the economy. Speciﬁcally, we assume the monetary authority follows the Taylor-type rule:




Log-linearising it around the steady state, one can get:
ˆ ıt = ρmˆ ıt−1 + φπ (1 − ρm)ˆ πt + φy (1 − ρm)˜ nt + εm
t (25)
Consistently with empirical evidence, we assume that monetary policy displays a cer-
tain degree ρm of interest rate smoothing18. The parameters φπ and φy are the response
coeﬃcients to inﬂation and the employment gap respectively. The term εm
t capture an
i.i.d monetary policy shock.
The model presented so far, although featuring several market imperfections and in-
stitutional parameters, can be reduced to a relatively simple three equations macro-model
as can be done with the standard NK model. The equilibrium in our economy with hiring
costs, Nash bargaining and equilibrium unemployment is fully characterised by the Euler
equation (that gives rise to the IS equation), the NKPC and the description of monetary
policy. Using the approximation ˆ ut = −(1 − u)ˆ nt, we can write the system as deviations
from steady state values as19:
17See Faia (2007) for similar results in a much richer model.
18See, e.g, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
19Notice that, to perform simulations, we have used the model derived in terms of deviations from steady
state instead that in terms of deviations from the ﬁrst best. We decided so mainly for two reasons. First,
the focus of the analysis is positive, and the model in terms of deviations from steady state is more directly
comparable with actual data (especially after thatb o t hh a v eb e e nd e t r e n d e di nt h es a m ew a y ) .A sm a n y
have highlighted, in fact (see e.g. Galì 2002), the theoretical output gap has a diﬀerent nature than the
HP-detrended output gap (and is much more diﬃcult to estimate). Second, the results of our model are





(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1)+Etˆ ut+1 − (1 − u)Et∆at+1 (26)
2. Monetary Policy
ˆ ıt = ρmˆ ıt−1 + φπ (1 − ρm)ˆ πt −
φy (1 − ρm)
(1 − u)
ˆ ut + εm
t (27)
3. NKPC
ˆ πt = βEt {ˆ πt+1} − κ0ˆ ut + κ1ˆ ut−1 + κ2Etˆ ut+1 − κ3ˆ at (28)
The main diﬀerence with respect to a standard NK model - apart from the fact that
here we allow for involuntary unemployment - lies in the NKPC, where the coeﬃcients κi
are now functions of the structural parameters characterizing the two economies: workers’
bargaining power, hiring costs, separation rates, markups, degree of nominal stickiness,
and so on. Intuitively, the introduction of hiring costs frictions substantially change the
dynamics of the marginal costs, which in turn inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ optimal price setting
and thus the slope of the Phillips curve.
Something more is to be said about the Phillips curve in (28). The current inﬂation




















δ (1 − u)
(1 + η)gα+ βg(α + αη(1 − x) − ηx)
where   =
χ
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δ (1 − u)
βg(α + αη (1 − x) − ηx)
κ3 =  (σ − 1)
As one can see from κ
0
0 and κ00
0,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcients which capture the current inﬂation
unemployment tradeoﬀ are determined by the interaction of two groups of structural para-
meteres: λ, which is inﬂuenced by the nominal rigidity indicator ζ, and various structural
imperfections of product (μ) and labour markets (α,η,δ).
22The tradeoﬀ is thus governed by the sensitivity of price adjustments to nominal shocks,
but also by all the factors that enhance the complementarities in price decisions and thus
amplify the macroeconomic impact of price stickiness at the single ﬁrm level. First of
all, a pricing complementarity (obtained by higher values of μ) reduces the incentive of
as i n g l eﬁrm to change its relative price and thus it is a source of stickiness which enters
as a multiplicative factor in κ
0
0 and κ00
0. Secondly, all the labour institutions that enhance
real wage rigidities reduce the individual incentive to price adjustment; in other words,
a demand shock requires a smaller change in relative price, the smaller is the change of
the real wage. This means that all the variables which cause a ﬂat wage curve and a ﬂat
supply curve strengthen the role of ζ, making it more likely a non vertical Phillips curve.
A more detailed analysis of such structural labour market imperfections shows that
the magnitude of hiring frictions and their combined inﬂuence (the multiplicative terms
in η, g,α in κ
00
0) play a role in explaining the inﬂation unemployment trade oﬀ.L e t u s
consider, for instance, the propagation mechanism in case of a monetary shock. Under
positive nominal shocks, as output raises and ﬁrms increase hirings, the labour market
tightens. However, unemployment reductions are smaller the higher are the hiring costs
and matching rents going to employees. Thus higher values of g, α, η, (thorough κ
00
0)a r e
accompanied by smaller decreases in unemployment and a more steep Phillips curve is
obtained.
Additional considerations relate to the role of ﬁring restrictions, negatively associated
with the separation rate: when the probability of leaving the ﬁrm δ is high, an exogenous
shock makes employment more sensitive to current labour market conditions; a low value
of δ implies that more jobs survive from one period to the next one, and it represents a
serious obstacle for a high degree of adjustment of current labour demand that ends to
generate a steeper Phillips Curve.
Furthermore, the inﬂation unemployment trade oﬀ is aﬀected by the job ﬁnding rate
x, as detectable by the espression for κ0.A h i g h e r v a l u e o f x means that recruiting
eﬀorts of employees have more chances to actually turn into eﬀective jobs; however, a high
value of x has also an alternative meaning since it represents a situation of labour market
tightness that reinforces the wage premia. A demand expansion that feeds inﬂation is thus
capable to deliver unemployment contractions the higher is x , thus the Phillips Curve
of our model economy is ﬂatter, the higher is x, as we will further examine in the next
section.
Finally, hiring frictions inﬂuence the intertemporal inﬂation-unemployment relation, a
23dynamic linkage totally absent in the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve. As shown
by (29), past and expected unemployment rates inﬂuence current inﬂation rates and, under
positive recruiting costs, even if price-setters are not backward-looking, current inﬂation
rates are in the end inﬂuenced by past hiring decisions. Therefore, the model with hiring
costs is suitable to replicate the persistent response of output and employment20. Indeed,
for a given amount of current labour demand Nit, the higher is the labour workforce
inherited by the previous recruiting eﬀorts (and thus the lower is the unemployment rate),
the lower are the today hirings needs, since Hi
t = Nit −(1−δ)Ni
t−1; moreover, for a given









and a positive link between lagged
unemployment rates and current marginal costs (and inﬂation rates) may be obtained.
The positive relation between expected unemployment and current inﬂation is reason-
able by simply recalling, as seen in section 3.2.2, that current marginal costs decrease with
the expected labour tighteness and thus one can easily justify κ2 > 0 . Both the dynamic
eﬀects, the lagged and the expected ones, are more signiﬁcant when workers and employees
are tied by long term relationships, as can be ascertained by inspecting the values of κ1
and κ2 which become larger for lower separation rates δ.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ef o c u so nt h ep o s i t i v ei m p l i c a t i o n so fd i ﬀerent labour market institu-
tions for the dynamic behaviour of the stylised economy. We ﬁrst compare the model with
a standard New Keynesian model, where structural imperfections in the labour market are
absent. We then perform a sensitivity analysis in order to explore how the economy re-
sponds to shocks as some fundamental parameters change. The model presented allows one
to pursue the analysis of the diﬀerences in dynamic performance between two economies,
characterised by diﬀerent degrees of market imperfection and labour protection.
7C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section we describe the parameter values used in our baseline calibration. These
parameters are chosen to be largely consistent with those standard in the New Keynesian
20By simply rewriting the New Keynesian Phillips Curve obtained in our model economy, one gets the
persistent and expected eﬀects that inﬂuence the current unemploymente rate:
















24literature. The following table summarises the baseline values for the key parameters of
our model with hiring costs:
Preferences and Technology βσ  μ
0.99 2 11 1.1
Labour market uxδ η
0.05 0.70 .12 0.5
Price nominal rigidity θ
0.75
Interest Rate rule ρm φπ φy
0.91 .10
Shocks’ Persistence and volatility ρm ρa σa σm
0.00 .90 .01 0.002
Preferences and technology: β is set equal to 0.99, which implies a riskless annual
return of about 4 percent (the time period is taken to correspond to a quarter). We
assume σ =2 , which implies a higher degree of risk aversion than that implied by a log
utility function. The elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods   is set equal
to 11, corresponding to a markup μ =1 .121. The steady state level of productivity A is
set equal to 1 only for simplicity.
The labour market: In the baseline calibration, we set unemployment to be u =0 .05,
which is roughly consistent with the average unemployment in the US. The steady state
job-ﬁnding rate x is set to 0.7, which corresponds approximately to a monthly rate of
0.3.G i v e n u and x, it is possible to determine the separation rate using the relation
δ = ux/((1 − u)(1− x)). W eo b t a i nav a l u ef o rδ roughly equal to 0.12.T h e r e l a t i v e
bargaining power η is set to 0.5, which implies that ﬁrms have higher bargaining power
than workers. The scaling parameter B is chosen such that hiring costs represent a 1
percent fraction of steady state output22. The parameters χ can then be determined using
steady state identities.
T h ed e g r e eo fp r i c er i g i d i t yθ is set equal to 0.75, as in Galí (2002), implying an average
duration of a price contract of one year (a level higher than that suggested in Galí and
Gertler, 1999 for the U.S. economy).
21Notice that a mark-up of 1.1 is deﬁnitely lower than the average (1970-1992) mark-up in manifacturing
estimated for several OECD countries by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, Pilat (1996).
22To pin down B, we use the fact that in steady state hiring costs represent a fraction δg = δB(x)
α of
GDP.
25Following Walsh (2005), we adopt a baseline interest rate rule for monetary policy
where the central bank is assumed to respond to inﬂation but not to the economic activity
(φy =0 ). Furthermore, we assume that the degree of inertia in the policy rule ρm equals
0.9, a value consistent with the empirical evidence on policy rules.
Persistence and volatility of shocks: productivity shocks have a persistence parameter
ρa =0 .9. Following Walsh (2005), we set the standard deviation of the policy shock
σm =0 .002 and the standard deviation of productivity shocks to σa =0 .01.
8 Comparison with the standard NK model
In this section, we compare the dynamics of our model with hiring costs with that of a
standard New Keynesian model. Notice that, for an easier comparison, we use exactly
the same parameter values for the two models. The only parameter that enters into the
standard NK model, but is absent in our model, is the inverse of the elasticity of labour
supply, v, which - consistently with micro evidence - we set equal to 3. The introduction of
hiring frictions substantially modiﬁes the working of the labour market and the trasmission
mechanism of shocks.
In the standard NK model the labour market is perfectly competitive and labour supply
and demand meet to clear the market. In the hiring costs model the presence of hiring
frictions introduces two opposite eﬀects. On the one side, labour demand becomes steeper.





















In the hiring costs model, marginal costs depend not only on real wages and productiv-
ity (as in the standard NK model), but also on marginal hiring costs, which are increasing
in xt = Ht
Ut . Increasing the number of employed in the economy thus raises hiring costs
and makes the adjustment on the labour quantity side more costly. When Ut is very small,
the labour demand schedule becomes almost vertical as hiring costs become prohibitively
high.
On the other side, the wage rule with hiring costs is ﬂatter than the labour supply
function in a standard New Keynesian model. By passing from the intensive to the exten-
sive margin of labour variations the reservation wage becomes more rigid and permits to
26Monetary policy shock: ABD vs NK
Figure 1: Monetary policy shock
lower the elasticity of real wages with respect to changes in output. This second channel
tends to limit changes in the price side and to increase the ﬂuctuation of quantities.
These two eﬀects operate in opposite directions and tend to oﬀset each other. It can be
shown that for reasonable parameter values (that is, as long as the elasticity of disutility
of labour to hours worked v>1), the second eﬀect tends to dominate, and the model with
hiring frictions is found to have more rigid real wages23.
Figure 1 show the impact of a monetary shock, which in our simulation takes the form
of a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate.
Several interesting facts emerge. First, inﬂation in the model with hiring costs appears
to be less volatile and slightly more persistent than in a standard NK economy. Second,
the response of employment shows higher persistence in the hiring model. Therefore, the
model with hiring costs is able to better replicate a central dynamic feature of real world
economies, namely “the sluggish response of inﬂation together with the large and persistent
















,w h e r eh is the ﬁxed amount of working hours.
On the contrary, in the standard NEK model, with utility function (1), the slope of the labour supply is
conditioned by ξh
v, where hours h are elastically supplied.
27response of output” (Trigari 2005, p. 2). Third, in the hiring-model the sensitivity of real
marginal costs and of real wages to output changes is much lower than in the standard NK
model. Interestingly, the low volatility of real wages is obtained endogenously, without
the need to impose an unexplained real wage rigidity.
The intuitive reasons behind the results here obtained are as follows: a positive nominal
shock causes an increase in the aggregate demand for goods and labour. Accordingly,
in period t recruiting activities and unit hiring costs also increase. However, for each
additional hiring undertaken in this period, there will be (1 − δ) more employed workers
in the next period. In this context, additional current hirings generate, in period t +1 ,
two externalities. On the one hand, through the thick market eﬀect, the increase in the
number of employed workers reduces the costs of new hires; on the other hand, a lower level
of unemployment has a negative impact since it represents an obstacle to the matching
process and thus increases hiring costs (thin market externality). These two forces - which
inﬂuence the labour market tightness index - may counterbalance one another and as a
net eﬀect may produce not only a less pronounced responsiveness of marginal costs to
employment ﬂuctuations, but also a smoother dynamics.
It must be noticed, as shown in Figure 1, that if the wage contraction is of limited
magnitude, the marginal cost response is wider, since it includes the contraction due
to savings in hiring costs; thus the gap between wage and cost changes, as analysed in
section 3.2.2, may contribute to explain the low correlation between inﬂation and real
wages observed in reality (Krause and Lubik, 2003). In any case, from the comparison of
the two models shown in Figure 1, it is relevant to stress a higher degree of rigidity in
marginal costs in the hiring model with respect to the parallel response recorded in the
standard NEK model, partially explained by the reversal impacts of expected hiring costs,
analysed in section 3.2. These divergent patterns are prolonged and last in subsequent
periods.
Our simple model with hiring costs is thus able to overcome many of the dynamic
weaknesses of the standard NK model. Furthermore, it can be shown that these dynamics,
obtained with a simple and tractable model, are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained
in those far more complex NK models which incorporate labour search (see e.g. Trigari,
2005 or Walsh, 2005).
Figure 2 shows the impact of a positive productivity shock in the hiring costs model
and in the standard NK model. The presence of hiring frictions substantially aﬀects the
dynamics of the real wages. In the standard NK model real wages decrease on impact
28Productivity shock: ABD vs NK
Figure 2: Productivity shock
but turn slightly positive in the medium run; in the hiring costs model, instead, real
wages react much less on impact and and converge slowly but monotonically. Accordingly,
marginal costs and inﬂation are less volatile in the model with hiring costs. Finally, the
presence of hiring frictions explains why employment reacts by less in the hiring costs
model than in the standard NK.
9I n ﬂa t i o na n dE m p l o y m e n tV o l a t i l i t ya n dL a b o u rM a r k e t
Institutions
The objective of this sections is to analyse how inﬂation and unemployment volatility
are inﬂuenced by diﬀerent labour market structures. Calibrating the degree of labour
market rigidities is a challenging task, as the overall degree of “rigidity” in the labour
market does not depend only on one parameter but on the overall conﬁguration of the
labour market, as captured by the interplay of diﬀerent parameters. It is common in the
literature to vary one parameter at a time; this strategy however ignores the fact that in
real world economies diﬀerent parameters are usually linked in an intuitive and predictable
way. Hereafter we analyse how inﬂation and unemployment volatility are inﬂuenced by




Figure 3: Labour market institutions and volatilities
institutions (as represented by measurable parameters)..
Speciﬁcally, following Blanchard and Galí (2006), we characterise the structure of
the labour market by calibrating the steady state unemployment and job-ﬁnding rates
(u and x); the separation rate is then determined through the steady state relationship
δ = ux/((1 − u)(1− x))24.F i g u r e 3 s h o w s h o w i n ﬂation and unemployment volatility
depend on the job-ﬁnding and the unemployment rates. Simulations are performed by
varying the job-ﬁnding rate from 0.25 to 0.75 and the unemployment rate from 0.11 to
0.05. Each point in the (x,u) plane corresponds to a diﬀerent steady state (i.e. to a
diﬀerent stylised economy); the vertical axes displays the corresponding level of inﬂation
and unemployment volatilities respectively25. The lower corner corresponds to a very
“rigid” country, i.e. a country characterised by both a low job-ﬁnding rate (0.25)a n da
high unemployment rate (0.11). The opposite holds for the upper corner. Both x and u
go therefore from the more rigid to the more ﬂexibile case.
Figure 3 allows one to analyse how the inﬂation and unemployment volatility of the
24We calibrate directly the job-ﬁnding rate and the unemployment rate because these are more easily
estimated than the reservation wage or the separation rate.
25Inﬂation and unemployment volatilities are obtained by simulating the model using both monetary
shocks and productivity shocks. The persistence and volatilities of shocks are calibrated as explained in
section 7.
30stylised economy change when the job-ﬁnding rate and/or the unemployment rate vary,
taking as given the monetary policy rule and the nature of exogenous shocks.
Consider at ﬁrst the coeteris paribus eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ej o bﬁnding rate x.F o r
a given level of the unemployment rate (for example u =0 .05), inﬂation volatility varies
between more than 1.6 when the job-ﬁnding rate is 0.3 to less than 1 when x =0 .75.
Unemployment volatility instead, for the same parameters’ values, goes from 0.55 to 1.1.
In other words, a higher job-ﬁnding rate reduces the volatility of inﬂation and increases
unemployment volatility. Intuitively, if the job-ﬁnding rate is higher, workers face a better
outside option (i.e. they can ﬁnd more easily another job) and they are therefore less
willing to accept a big reduction in wages in order to keep the job. The volatility of real
wages, marginal costs and inﬂation is thus inversely related to the job-ﬁnding rate; the
opposite holds for the volatility of unemployment.
Interestingly, the coeteris paribus eﬀect of a decrease in the steady state unemploy-
ment rate u is just opposite. For instance, for a job-ﬁnding rate ﬁxed at x =0 .3,i n ﬂation
volatility increases from around 1 to more than 1.6 when u goes from 0.11 to 0.05; unem-
ployment volatility instead decreases from almost 1 to less than 0.6. The intuition behind
this result is as follow. In the model, coeteris paribus, a lower unemployment can only be





and a lower probability of job termination δ. A lower steady state reservation wage
implies a lower degree of real wage rigidity, since the portion of wages that is relatively
insensitive to market variations is relatively smaller; when the probability of exogenous
separation gets lower, instead, more matches survive from one period to the other and
employment becomes less sensitive to labour market conditions. These two channels thus
go in the same direction, and explain why, in our model, the volatility of unemployment
is positively related to the steady state unemployment rate.
Figure 4 shows the implications of diﬀerent labour market structures for the tradeoﬀ
between inﬂation volatility and unemployment volatility (simply calculated as the ratio
among the two). Diﬀerent labour market institutions determine how costly it is for ﬁrms
to absorb shocks by changing prices or by changing the quantities produced. A higher job-
ﬁnding rate, which makes the adjustment on the quantity side easier, tends to increase
unemployment volatility and to decrease inﬂation volatility: the tradeoﬀ decreases. A
lower unemployment rate, which has the opposite eﬀect, increases the tradeoﬀ between
inﬂation volatility and unemployment volatility.
In a more rigid economy, which is typically characterised by a lower job-ﬁnding rate but
31Trade off between inflation and unemployment volatility
Figure 4: Trade oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment volatility
a higher unemployment rate, the two eﬀects tend thus to operate in opposite directions.
Which one is likely to dominate? To answer this question, we start by noticing that
it is diﬃcult to imagine economies characterised by a low job-ﬁnding rate and a low
unemployment rate, and viceversa. Indeed, job-ﬁnding rates and unemployment rate seem
to be linked in the following way: countries with low job-ﬁnding rates are usually those
with higher unemployment rate, and viceversa. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
real world economies are placed around the North-Sud diagonal in Figure 4.
We therefore focus on this diagonal and construct a “labour market ﬂexibility” index
that deﬁnes a labour market as ﬂexible when it is characterised by high job-ﬁnding and
low unemployment rates. Speciﬁcally, we take a one dimensional look in which the job
ﬁnding rate and the unemployment rate are linearly linked. Figure 5 shows the relationship
between the job-ﬁnding rate x, the unemployment rate u and the implied separation rate
δ used in the calibration. Notice that to any particular value of labour market rigidity
corresponds a diﬀerent steady state and that in a rigid economy, as in real data, a low
job-ﬁnding rate is associated with a low separation rate and a high unemployment rate.
The results of the simulations performed by varying the degree of labour market ﬂexi-
bility are in Figure 6. More rigid labour markets tend to increase the volatility of inﬂation
and to decrease the volatility of real variables. The trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unem-
32Labour market flexibility index
Figure 5: Labour market ﬂexibility index
ployment volatility is therefore increasing in the degree of labour market rigidity. These
two results can be reconciled by looking at the impulse response functions (see the appen-
dix). When labour markets are more rigid, monetary shocks are mainly absorbed through
a large (but short-lived) increase in inﬂation, while both monetary and productivity shocks
entail smaller unemployment ﬂuctuations. Intuitively, when hiring new workers becomes
more costly, ﬁrms ﬁnd relatively more convenient to absorb a shock through changes in
prices than through changes in the produced quantities. As a consequence, inﬂation reacts
more to shocks while the response of (detrended) output and unemployment gets smaller.
More sophisticated explanations can be given. As noted before, what we show is a
purely general equilibrium result. Coeteris paribus,h i g h e rj o b - ﬁnding and separation rates
both increase unemployment volatility. A higher steady state job-ﬁnding rate increases
the negotiated wage and the degree of real wage rigidity: inﬂation becomes less sensitive
to unemployment changes (the Phillips curve gets ﬂatter). Similarly, as the probability
of exogenous separation gets higher, fewer matches survive from one period to the other
and employment becomes more sensitive to labour market conditions. Again, this implies
that inﬂation is less sensitive to unemployment changes. A lower steady state unemploy-
ment rate has the opposite eﬀect, as a lower unemployment rate is explained by a lower
reservation wage and a lower separation rate, which both tend to decrease unemployment
33Rigid vs flexible economies
Figure 6: Rigid vs ﬂexible economies
volatility.
As we have just shown, under realistic values of these variables, the ﬁrst two eﬀects
dominate and more “ﬂexible” labour markets tend to be characterised by bigger real
ﬂuctuations (as the Phillips curve gets ﬂatter). These ﬁndings seem to mimic well the
actual experience of the US and Euro area economies, the US being more ﬂexible and
displaying more volatile output levels and the Euro area being more rigid and displaying
less volatile output levels but more volatile inﬂation (Giannone, Reichlin, 2006).
10 Conclusion
There is by now a number of papers aimed at overcoming the main shortcomings of
the standard New Keynesian model, i.e. the absence of involuntary unemployment, the
absence of a trade oﬀ between output and inﬂation stabilisation and the low and persistent
output response to shocks. In the present paper we show that a relatively easy to model
labour market imperfection, due to hiring costs (ál aHowitt), is suﬃcient to overcome the
shortcomings of the standard New Keynesian model, without introducing an exogenous
real wage rigidity (as done, for instance by Blanchard, Galí, 2006, 2007).
We have seen that the introduction of a more realistic labour market structure into
34an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework is capable of delivering involuntary un-
employment as a steady state equilibrium and the breakdown of the so called divine
coincidence. The existence of a dynamic externality - due to the eﬀects of hiring decisions
on hiring costs faced by ﬁrms - makes the dynamic behaviour of a decentralised economy
diﬀer from that of the constrained eﬃcient economy and leads the divine coincidence to
vanish. After allowing for staggered pricing àl aC a l v o , we showed that - due to the ab-
sence of divine coincidence - neither is pure inﬂation targeting able to stabilise employment
ﬂuctuations nor is pure employment targeting able to stabilise inﬂation, as it would be
the case in a standard NK model.
The NKPC tradeoﬀ found in the present paper is not only aﬀected by the degree
of nominal rigidity, but also by the combined inﬂuence of several labour market struc-
tural features, including the bargaining power of workers, the separation rate and the job
ﬁnding rate. Moreover, hiring frictions inﬂuence both the current and the intertemporal
inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ, generating a persistent dynamic response of output and
employment to shocks. In such a context it seems at least unwarrented the so called
“World Consensus on Monetary Policy” claimed by Marvin Goodfriend (2007), according
to whom “inﬂation targeting yields the best cyclical behaviour of employment and output
that monetary policy can deliver. Thus, and here is a revolutionary point delivered by the
modern theoretical consensus, even those who care mainly about stabilization of the real
economy can support a low-inﬂation objective for monetary policy” (Goodfriend, 2007,
p. 61). A study of optimal monetary policy in an economy such as that analysed in the
present paper is in the agenda for further research.
The model advanced in this paper allows us to analyse how unemployment and inﬂa-
tion volatilities are aﬀected by diﬀerent labour market structures. As a lower job ﬁnding
rate and a high unemployment rate tend to aﬀect the ratio of inﬂation to unemployment
volatility in opposite directions, we deﬁned a labour market ﬂexibility index, according
to which a more ﬂexible labour market is characterised by high job-ﬁnding and low un-
employment rates. A priori one would expect that in a more rigid economy the cost of
adjusting quantitities (hiring and ﬁring workers) is higher than the cost of adjusting prices.
As a consequence, a more rigid economy should display a lower volatility of unemployment
and a higher volatility of inﬂa t i o nt h a naﬂexible economy. The simulations performed
conﬁrm this intuition and are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of Giannone, Reichlin
(2006) referred to the “ﬂexible” US and the comparatively “rigid” Euro area. Although
such a consistency is encouraging, a full-ﬂedged empirical analysis of the relations between
35volatilities and labour market imperfections is to be done.
11 References
Alexopoulos M. (2004), “Unemployment and the Business Cycle”, Journal of Monetary Economics,
vol. 51, pp. 277-298.
Bernanke B.S., Woodford M. (2005), The Inﬂation-Targeting Debate, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Studies in Business Cycle, Chicago, Chicago University Press.
Blanchard O., (2006), “European Unemployment: the Evolution of Facts and Ideas”, Economic
Policy, vol. 21, pp. 1-54.
Blanchard O., Galí J., (2006), “A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment”, MIT Working
Paper.
Blanchard O., Galí J., (2007), “Real wage rigidities and the New Keynesian model”, Journal
of Money Credit and Banking, vol. 39, supplement, pp. 35-66.
Blinder A. S. et al (1998), Asking about Prices. A New Approach to Understanding Price
Stickiness, New York, Russel Sage Foundation.
Calvo G. (1983), “Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 12, pp. 383-98.
Carlton D.W. (1986), “The Rigidity of Prices”, American Economic Review, vol. 76, pp.
637-58.
Chari V.V., Kehoe P. J., McGrattan E.R. (2000), “Sticky Price models of the Business Cycle:
Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Peristence Problem?", Econometrica, vol. 68, pp. 1151-1180.
Christiano L.J., Eichnbaum M., Evans C. (2005),“Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamics Eﬀects
of a Shock to Monetary Policy”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, pp. 1- 45.
Christoﬀel K., Linzert T. (2005), “The Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labour Market Frictions
for Unemployment and Inﬂation Dynamics", European Central Bank Working Paper Series, n. 556.
Christoﬀel K, Kuester K., Linzert T (2006), “Identifying the Role of labour Markets for Mon-
etary Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model”, European Central Bank Working Paper Series,n .
635.
Clarida R., Galí J., Gertler M. (1999), “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian
Perspective”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 37, pp. 1661-1707.
Danthine J. O. Kurmann A. (2004), “Fair Wages in a New Keynesian Model of the Business
Cycle”, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 7, pp. 107-142.
36Dixit A., Stiglitz J. E. (1977), “Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product Diversity”,
American Economic Review, vol. 67, pp. 298-308.
Faia E. (2007), “Ramsey monetary policy with labour market frictions”, European Central
Bank Working Paper Series, n. 707.
Felices G. (2002), “Eﬃciency Wages in a New Keynesian Framework”, New York University,
mimeo.
Galí J. (2002), “New Perspectives on Monetary Policy, Inﬂation and the Business Cycle”,
CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 3210.
Galí J., Gertler M. (1999), “Inﬂation Dynamics: a Structural Econometric Analysis, Journal
of Monetary Economics, vol. 44, pp. 195-222.
Galí J., Gertler M. (2007), “Macroeconomic Modeling for Monetary Policy Evaluation, NBER
Working Paper, n. 13542.
Giannone D., Reichlin L. (2006), “Trend and cycles in the Euro area”, European Central Bank
Working Paper Series, n. 595.
Goodfriend M. (2007), “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy”, The Journal
f Economic Perspectives, vol. 21, pp. 47-68.
Goodfriend M., King R.G. (1997), “The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary
Policy”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 12. pp. 231-83.
Hall R. E. (1995), “Lost Jobs”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp. 221-256.
Hall R. E. (2005), “Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness”, American
Economic Review, vol. 95, pp. 50- 65.
Howitt P. (1988), “Business Cycles with Costly Search and Recruiting”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 103, pp.147-165.
Jeanne O. (1998), “Generating Real Persistence Eﬀects of Monetary Shocks: How Much Nom-
inal Rigidity Do We Really Need?”, European Economic Review, vol. 42, pp. 1009-1032.
Keynes J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, MacMil-
lan.
Krause M.U., Lubik T.A. (2003),“The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage Rigidity in the New Keyne-
s i a nM o d e lw i t hS e a r c hF r i c t i o n s ” ,Economics Department Working Paper, n. 504, John Hopkins
University.
Mankiw N.G., Reis R. (2002), “Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: a Proposal to Replace
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 17, pp. 1295-1329.
Mankiw N.G., Romer D. (1991) “Introduction”, in Mankiw N.G., Romer D. (eds.), New
Keynesian Economics, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, pp. 1-26.
37McCallum B. T., Nelson E. (1999), ”An Optimizing IS-LM Speciﬁcation for Monetary Policy
and Business Cycle Analysis”, Journal of Mony, Credit and Banking, vol. 31, pp.296-316.
Mortensen D.T., Pissarides C.A.(1994), “Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of
Unemployment”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 61, pp. 397-416.
Mortensen D.T., Pissarides C.A.(1999), “New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour
Market”, CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 2053.
Oliveira Martins J., Scarpetta S., Pilat D. (1996),“Mark-up ratios in Manifacturing Industries”,
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, n. 162.
Pencavel J. (1986), “Labour Supply of Men: a Survey”, in Ashenfelter O., Layard R, (eds.),
Handbook of labour Economics, vol. 1, Amsterdam, North Holland, pp. 3 - 102.
Petrongolo B., Pissarides C.A. (2001), “Looking into the Black Box”, Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 39, pp. 390-431.
Pigou A.C. (1933), The Theory of Unemployment, London, MacMillan.
Rabanal P. (2001), “Real Wage Rigidities, Endogenous Persistence and Optimal Monetary
Policy”, mimeo.
Ravenna F., Walsh C.E. (2007), “Vacancies, unemployment and the Phillips curve”, mimeo.
Shimer R. (2005), “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies”,
American Economic Review, vol. 95, pp. 25-49.
Smets F., Wouters R. (2003), “An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
of the Euro Area”, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, pp. 527-549.
Taylor J.B. (1993), “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Series on
Public Policy, 39, pp. 195-214.
Trigari A. (2005), “Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows and Inﬂation Dynamics”, mimeo,
IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan.
Trigari A. (2004), “Labour Market Search, Wage Bargaining and Inﬂation Dynamics”, mimeo,
IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan.
Uhlig H., (1997), “A Toolkit for Analyzing Non-Linear Dynamics Stochastic Models Easily”,
mimeo.
Walsh C.E. (2005), “Labour Market Search, Sticky Prices, and Interest Rate Policies, Review
of Economic Dynamics, vol. 8, pp. 829 - 849.
Woodford M. (2003), Interest and Prices, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.
38A Impulse Responses
39 




1. L. Giuriato, Problemi di sostenibilità di programmi di riforma strutturale, 
settembre 1993. 
2. L. Giuriato, Mutamenti di regime e riforme: stabilità politica e comportamenti 
accomodanti, settembre 1993. 
3. U. Galmarini, Income Tax Enforcement Policy with Risk Averse Agents, 
novembre 1993. 
4. P. Giarda, Le competenze regionali nelle recenti proposte di riforma 
costituzionale, gennaio 1994. 
5. L. Giuriato, Therapy by Consensus in Systemic Transformations: an Evolutionary 
Perspective, maggio 1994. 
6. M. Bordignon, Federalismo, perequazione e competizione fiscale. Spunti di 
riflessione in merito alle ipotesi di riforma della finanza regionale in Italia, aprile 
1995. 
7. M. F. Ambrosanio, Contenimento del disavanzo pubblico e controllo delle 
retribuzioni nel pubblico impiego, maggio 1995. 
8. M. Bordignon, On Measuring Inefficiency in Economies with Public Goods: an 
Overall Measure of the Deadweight Loss of the Public Sector, luglio 1995. 
9. G. Colangelo, U. Galmarini, On the Pareto Ranking of Commodity Taxes in 
Oligopoly, novembre 1995. 
10. U. Galmarini, Coefficienti presuntivi di reddito e politiche di accertamento 
fiscale, dicembre 1995. 
11. U. Galmarini, On the Size of the Regressive Bias in Tax Enforcement, febbraio 
1996. 
12. G. Mastromatteo, Innovazione di Prodotto e Dimensione del Settore Pubblico 
nel Modello di Baumol, giugno 1996. 
13. G. Turati,  La tassazione delle attività finanziarie in Italia: verifiche empiriche 
in tema di efficienza e di equità, settembre 1996. 
14. G. Mastromatteo,  Economia monetaria post-keynesiana e rigidità dei tassi 
bancari, settembre 1996. 
15. L. Rizzo, Equalization of Public Training Expenditure in a Cross-Border 
Labour Market, maggio 1997. 
16. C. Bisogno, Il mercato del credito e la propensione al risparmio delle famiglie: 
aggiornamento di un lavoro di Jappelli e Pagano, maggio 1997. 
  17. F.G. Etro, Evasione delle imposte indirette in oligopolio. Incidenza e ottima 
tassazione, luglio 1997. 
  18. L. Colombo, Problemi di adozione tecnologica in un’industria monopolistica, 
ottobre 1997. 
  19. L. Rizzo, Local Provision of Training in a Common Labour Market, marzo 
1998. 
20. M.C. Chiuri, A Model for the Household Labour Supply: An Empirical Test On 
A Sample of Italian Household with Pre-School Children, maggio 1998. 
21. U. Galmarini, Tax Avoidance and Progressivity of the Income Tax in an 
Occupational Choice Model, luglio 1998. 
22. R. Hamaui, M. Ratti, The National Central Banks’ Role under EMU. The Case 
of the Bank of Italy, novembre 1998.  
23. A. Boitani, M. Damiani, Heterogeneous Agents, Indexation and the Non 
Neutrality of Money, marzo 1999. 
24. A. Baglioni, Liquidity Risk and Market Power in Banking, luglio 1999. 
25. M. Flavia Ambrosanio, Armonizzazione e concorrenza fiscale: la politica della 
Comunità Europea, luglio 1999. 
26. A. Balestrino, U. Galmarini, Public Expenditure and Tax Avoidance, ottobre 
1999. 
27. L. Colombo, G. Weinrich, The Phillips Curve as a Long-Run Phenomenon in a 
Macroeconomic Model with Complex Dynamics, aprile 2000. 
28. G.P. Barbetta, G. Turati, L’analisi dell’efficienza tecnica nel settore della sanità. 
Un’applicazione al caso della Lombardia, maggio 2000. 
29. L. Colombo, Struttura finanziaria delle imprese, rinegoziazione del debito Vs. 
Liquidazione. Una rassegna della letteratura, maggio 2000. 
30. M. Bordignon, Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental 
Relationships: the Case of Italy, giugno 2000. 
31. A. Boitani, M. Damiani, Strategic complementarity, near-rationality and 
coordination, giugno 2000. 
32. P. Balduzzi, Sistemi pensionistici a ripartizione e a capitalizzazione: il caso 
cileno e le implicazioni per l’Italia, luglio 2000. 
33. A. Baglioni, Multiple Banking Relationships: competition among “inside” 
banks, ottobre 2000. 
34. A. Baglioni, R. Hamaui, The Choice among Alternative Payment Systems: The 
European Experience, ottobre 2000. 
35. M.F. Ambrosanio, M. Bordignon, La concorrenza fiscale in Europa: evidenze, 
dibattito, politiche, novembre 2000. 
36. L. Rizzo, Equalization and Fiscal Competition: Theory and Evidence, maggio 
2001. 
37. L. Rizzo, Le Inefficienze del Decentramento Fiscale, maggio 2001. 
38. L. Colombo, On the Role of Spillover Effects in Technology Adoption Problems, 
maggio 2001. 
39. L. Colombo, G. Coltro, La misurazione della produttività: evidenza empirica e 
problemi metodologici, maggio 2001. 
40. L. Cappellari, G. Turati, Volunteer Labour Supply: The Role of Workers’ 
Motivations, luglio 2001. 
41. G.P. Barbetta, G. Turati, Efficiency of junior high schools and the role of 
proprietary structure, ottobre 2001. 
42. A. Boitani, C. Cambini, Regolazione incentivante per i servizi di trasporto 
locale, novembre 2001. 
43. P. Giarda, Fiscal federalism in the Italian Constitution: the aftermath of the 
October 7
th referendum, novembre 2001. 
44. M. Bordignon, F. Cerniglia, F. Revelli, In Search for Yardstick Competition: 
Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities, marzo 2002. 
45. F. Etro, International Policy Coordination with Economic Unions, marzo 2002. 
46. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, A Puzzle Solved: the Euro is the D.Mark, settembre 
2002. 
47. A. Baglioni, Bank Capital Regulation and Monetary Policy Transmission: an 
heterogeneous agents approach, ottobre 2002. 
48. A. Baglioni, The New Basle Accord: Which Implications for Monetary Policy 
Transmission?, ottobre 2002. 
49. F. Etro, P. Giarda, Redistribution, Decentralization and Constitutional Rules, 
ottobre 2002. 
50. L. Colombo, G. Turati, La Dimensione Territoriale nei Processi di 
Concentrazione dell’Industria Bancaria Italiana, novembre 2002.  
51. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, The Reputation of a newborn Central Bank, marzo 
2003. 
52. M. Bordignon, L. Colombo, U. Galmarini, Fiscal Federalism and Endogenous 
Lobbies’ Formation, ottobre 2003. 
53. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, The Reaction of central banks to Stock Markets, 
novembre 2003. 
54. A. Boitani, C. Cambini, Le gare per i servizi di trasporto locale in Europa e in 
Italia: molto rumore per nulla?, febbraio 2004. 
55. V. Oppedisano, I buoni scuola: un’analisi teorica e un esperimento empirico 
sulla realtà lombarda, aprile 2004. 
56. M. F. Ambrosanio, Il ruolo degli enti locali per lo sviluppo sostenibile: prime 
valutazioni, luglio 2004. 
57. M. F. Ambrosanio, M. S. Caroppo, The Response of Tax Havens to Initiatives 
Against Harmful Tax Competition: Formal Statements and Concrete Policies, 
ottobre 2004. 
58. A. Monticini, G. Vaciago, Are Europe’s Interest Rates led by FED 
Announcements?, dicembre 2004. 
59. A. Prandini, P. Ranci, The Privatisation Process, dicembre 2004. 
60. G. Mastromatteo, L. Ventura, Fundamentals, beliefs, and the origin of money: a 
search theoretic perspective, dicembre 2004. 
61. A. Baglioni, L. Colombo, Managers’ Compensation and Misreporting, dicembre 
2004. 
62. P. Giarda, Decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations in Italy: a 
review of past and recent trends, gennaio 2005. 
63. A. Baglioni, A. Monticini, The Intraday price of money: evidence from the e-
MID market, luglio 2005. 
64. A. Terzi, International Financial Instability in a World of Currencies Hierarchy, 
ottobre 2005. 
65. M. F. Ambrosanio, A. Fontana, Ricognizione delle Fonti Informative sulla 
Finanza Pubblica Italiana, gennaio 2006. 
66. L. Colombo, M. Grillo, Collusion when the Number of Firms is Large, marzo 
2006. 
67. A. Terzi, G. Verga, Stock-bond correlation and the bond quality ratio: Removing 
the discount factor to generate a “deflated” stock index, luglio 2006. 
68. M. Grillo, The Theory and Practice of Antitrust. A perspective in the history of 
economic ideas, settembre 2006. 
69. A. Baglioni, Entry into a network industry: consumers’ expectations and firms’ 
pricing policies, novembre 2006. 
70. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, Lessons from the ECB experience: Frankfurt still 
matters!, marzo 2007. 
71. G. Vaciago, Gli immobili pubblici…..ovvero, purché restino immobili, marzo 
2007. 
72. F. Mattesini, L. Rossi, Productivity shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy in a 
Unionized Labor Market Economy, marzo 2007. 
73. L. Colombo, G. Femminis, The Social Value of Public Information with Costly 
Information Acquisition, marzo 2007. 
74. L. Colombo, H. Dawid, K. Kabus, When do Thick Venture Capital Markets 
Foster Innovation? An Evolutionary Analysis, marzo 2007. 
75. A. Baglioni, Corporate Governance as a Commitment and Signalling Device, 
novembre 2007. 
76. L. Colombo, G. Turati, The Role of the Local Business Environment in Banking 
Consolidation, febbraio 2008.  
77. F. Mattesini, L. Rossi, Optimal Monetary Policy in Economies with Dual Labor 
Markets, febbraio 2008. 
78. M. Abbritti, A. Boitani, M. Damiani, Labour market imperfections, “divine 
coincidence” and the volatility of employment and inflation, marzo 2008. 
 